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Case No. 20110495-CA 
IN THE 
UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
State of Utah, 
Plaintiff/ Appellee, 
vs. 
Jeremy D. Penick, 
Defendant/ Appellant. 
Brief of Appellee 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
Defendant appeals from a conviction for attempted murder. This Court has 
jurisdiction under the pour-over provision of Utah Code Ann. § 78A-4-103(2)(j) 
(West 2009). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE 
Was Defendant's trial counsel ineffective for not moving to suppress evidence 
obtained following an allegedly unlawful arrest? 
Standard of Review. "An ineffective assistance of counsel claim raised for the 
first time on appeal presents a question of law" reviewed for correctness. State v. 
Clark, 2004 UT 25, f 6, 89 P.3d 162. 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES 
U.S. Const, amend. IV (reproduced in Addendum A). 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
' STATEMENT OF THE CASE , - ; 
A, Summary of the facts. 
The offense. On December 19,2009, Joseph Magack, a taxi driver, received a 
dispatch directing him to pick up passengers at the Motel 6 at 176 East 600 South in 
Salt Lake City. R210:32-33. When he arrived, Defendant and a tall, thin white man, 
later identified as Joseph Ramsey, were waiting outside the motel office. R210:34-35. 
Ramsey took the seat directly behind Magack. R210:36. Defendant attempted to sit 
next to the driver in the front passenger seat. R210:35-36. Because some things were 
on the seat, he sat down in the back seat on Ramsey's right side, R210:35-37. 
When Magack asked where the men wanted to go, one said to the Fairway 
Apartments and the other said to the Park Place Apartments. R210:37. When 
Magack said he knew the location of the Park Place Apartments, they told him to 
take them there. Id. Although the men had been talking to each other, they stopped 
talking and were very quiet during the trip. R210:37-38. Magack said there was a 
lot of fog that night. R210:38. One of them responded, "[T]his night is going to be 
crazy/7 Id. 
When Magack reached the front gate of the apartment complex, the men told 
him to drive inside. R210:39. After Magack drove them 60 meters inside the 
complex, he asked," [H]ere?" Id. They hesitated for a long time and then told him 
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to drive further in. Id. At the end of the driveway, Magack turned right and again 
asked them if this was the destination. R210:40. They again hesitated, but finally 
said they were going to get out. Id. Magack pushed a button to unlock the door, 
and they slid the door open. R210:41. They then told Magack to drive into a 
parking stall, and he pulled into a parking stall with the taxi's sliding door still 
open. R210:44. 
As soon as Magack put the taxi in park, the white man grabbed Magack's 
neck with his left arm, restrained Magack with that arm, and used a knife in his 
right hand to stab Magack. R210:46-47,71. Defendant also stabbed Magack —once 
in his shoulder and twice in his side. R210:48, 71. 
Magack tried to defend himself and get out of the taxi. R210:49. He tried to 
push back and punch Defendant to stop the stabbing. Id. Both men were "punching 
and pushing" Magack as he tried to get out of his seatbelt and flee the taxi. R210:49-
50. As Magack tried to slide his arm and leg out the driver's side door, Ramsey 
continued to hold his neck. R210:51. Defendant grabbed Magack's right arm with 
his two hands, trying to restrain him. Id. 
The attack lasted 15 to 20 seconds. R210:52. Magack sustained more than 
nine stab wounds. R210:52. Magack, a fourth degree black belt in his native Sudan, 
finally unlatched his seat belt and broke free. R210:47,52-53. After Magack escaped 
the taxi, Defendant and Ramsey headed east, running as fast as they could. R210:54. 
3 
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Magack called the police, and an ambulance transported him to the hospital. 
R210:57. 
Facts relevant to arrest. Police and emergency personnel responded to the 
call, and Magack told them about the attack. R210:82-83. Detective Derek Coats 
was assigned to investigate the case. R211:15-16. He was initially given 
descriptions of the two males who had attacked Magack. R211:16. He was also told 
that officers went to the Motel 6 on the night of the crime, and motel staff provided a 
surveillance videotape of the events at the motel just before Magack arrived. 
R211:17-18. The motel clerk, who had called the taxi, told police that the call was 
made at the request of two men who had come to the office window. R211:19. The 
clerk identified the two men in the video as the two men who requested the taxi. 
R211:18-19. 
Detective Coats also made still shots from the video; prepared an information 
bulletin; and delivered copies of the still shots, the video, and the bulletin to the 
police public information unit for dissemination to the media and other members of 
the public. R211:20; see also State's Exhibit 13 (a colored photo that was one of the 
still shots distributed to the press) (included in Addendum B) (also reproduced in 
black and white at R121). At about this time, Detective Coats received a phone call 
from an unidentified female. R211:20-21. She said "that she knew of two males that 
were talking about attacking a taxi cab driver and then provided a name and 
4 
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description/' R211:21. The caller also told Detective Coats that the people involved 
with the taxi attack were located at the Volunteers of America Shelter (VOA) for 
Youth. R211:22. 
Based on this specific information, Detective Coats and his squad went to the 
VOA shelter to look for the two men recorded on the Motel 6 video. R211:23. As 
they walked in, Detective Coats saw a black male who looked like the black male in 
the video. R211:23. The black male was wearing the same pants that the suspect in 
the video had worn. R211:74-75. At trial, Detective Coats identified the black male 
as Defendant. Id. As Detective Coats walked in, Defendant looked at him and then 
immediately averted his eyes. R211:24. Defendant then approached the detective, 
locked eyes with him, and asked why he was there and if he "was going to help 
with donations for the VOA and what [he was] investigating/' R211:24. Detective 
Coats asked one of the other officers to watch Defendant, spoke to the shelter 
director, and then took Defendant into custody. R211:26. 
During an interview at the police station, Defendant made a number of 
statements. He identified himself in the still shot of the Motel 6 lobby, but said the 
photo had been taken a week earlier, rather than a couple of days before when the 
incident occurred. R211:29-30. He said he had called the taxi for someone named 
Josh, but that they then "went their separate ways/7 R211:31. 
5 
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In a second interview immediately following the first, Defendant said that he 
had been at the Motel 6 and also admitted that he called for a taxi about the time the 
crime occurred. R211:36. But he asserted that he did not remember the name of the 
other man. R211:36-37. Defendant finally offered that the man's street name was 
"Rabbit" R211:37. Defendant admitted that he had called for the taxi, but claimed 
that he went his separate way as the other man got into the taxi. See R211:36-37. 
Detective Coats later confirmed with the other man, Joseph Ramsey, that his street 
name was Rabbit. R211:37. 
A short while later, Defendant offered a third version of what happened that 
night. R211:38. He claimed he met Rabbit at the VOA, they went to the Motel 6, 
and Defendant called for the taxi. R211:36-39. This time Defendant admitted that he 
got into the taxi with the white male. Id. Defendant said they went to an apartment 
complex near the library and, as they were getting out of the taxi, the white male 
suddenly attacked the driver. R211:40. Defendant said that he tried to pull the 
white male off the driver, but conceded that "it would have looked like he 
[Defendant] was an attacker." R211:41. Defendant also conceded that although he 
knew Magack had been stabbed, he did not call an ambulance or otherwise attempt 
to help Magack. R211-.155-57. 
6 
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B. Proceedings below. 
Defendant was charged with attempted murder and aggravated robbery. 
R7-9. Defendant did not move to suppress any evidence. See Pleadings File; see also 
Br. Appellant at 2. A jury found him guilty of both crimes. R161-62. 
Defendant filed a motion to arrest judgment, arguing that the evidence did 
not support the guilty verdict on the aggravated robbery, because there was no 
evidence that Defendant had the intent to deprive Magack of any property. R171-
77. The court granted Defendant's motion and dismissed the robbery count. R198-
99. Defendant was sentenced to a prison term of three years to life on his conviction 
for attempted murder. Id. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Defendant claims that his trial counsel was ineffective for not moving to 
suppress Defendant's statements to police following his arrest. Defendant asserts 
that the arrest was unlawful, that he would therefore have prevailed on a motion to 
suppress, that counsel performed deficiently for not moving to suppress, and that 
Defendant suffered prejudice as a result. 
Because Defendant has not demonstrated that the arrest was unlawful, he 
cannot prevail on his ineffective assistance claim. Defendant cobbles together a few 
points of testimony introduced at trial and suggests that that testimony is 
insufficient to show probable cause. But the testimony to which he points does not 
7 
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demonstrate that the police lacked probable cause. On the contrary, that testimony, 
together with other trial testimony that Defendant ignores, demonstrates that police 
did, in fact, have probable cause. More significantly, the trial testimony does not 
provide an adequate record to demonstrate that probable cause was lacking, that the 
arrest was illegal, that counsel performed deficiently, or that Defendant suffered 
prejudice. No one asked the officer what he knew when he arrested Defendant. The 
prosecution asked him about factual matters necessary to show guilt, not probable 
cause, and defense counsel cross-examined regarding those matters. 
As a result, Defendant has not met his burden to present an adequate record 
to prove his claim. Rather, this Court must construe all ambiguities and deficiencies 
in the record in favor or a finding that trial counsel was effective. Construing the 
ambiguities and deficiencies as so required, this Court must find that Defendant has 
not shown ineffective assistance. 
8 
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ARGUMENT 
DEFENDANT HAS NOT MET HIS HEAVY BURDEN OF 
PROVING THAT COUNSEL PERFORMED DEFICIENTLY OR 
THAT ANY DEFICIENCY PREJUDICED HIM 
Defendant claims on appeal that at the time he was arrested, the arresting 
officer lacked probable cause to believe that Defendant was one of the two men who 
committed the attack and that the arrest was therefore unlawful. See Br. Appellant 
at 14-15. Defendant claims that consequently his trial counsel was ineffective for not 
moving to suppress the statements Defendant made following the arrest. See id. 
A. Background law—ineffective assistance. 
To establish ineffective assistance, Defendant must prove that counsel's 
performance was deficient—that is, it did not meet an objective standard of 
reasonableness — by identifying specific acts or omissions he alleges did not result 
from reasonable professional judgment. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668,687-
88, 690 (1984). Defendant must also prove that" there is a reasonable probability 
that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would 
have been different." Id. at 694; see also State v. Litherland, 2000 UT 76,119,12 P.3d 
92. "Where defense counsel's failure to litigate a Fourth Amendment claim 
competently is the principal allegation of ineffectiveness, the defendant must also 
prove that his Fourth Amendment claim is meritorious and that there is a 
reasonable probability that the verdict would have been different absent the 
9 
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excludable evidence in order to demonstrate actual prejudice." Kimmelman v. 
Morrison, 477 U.S. 365,375 (1986). 
In making a claim of ineffective assistance, Defendant also bears the burden of 
assuring that "the record is adequate." Litherland, 2000 UT 76, f 16. As a result, "an 
appellate court will presume that any argument of ineffectiveness presented to it is 
supported by all the relevant evidence of which [the] defendant is aware." Id. at ^ 
17. "Where the record appears inadequate in any fashion, ambiguities or 
deficiencies resulting therefrom simply will be construed in favor of a finding that 
counsel performed effectively." Id. 
With respect to the first Strickland prong, an appellate court "must indulge a 
strong presumption that counsel's conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable 
professional assistance; that is, the defendant must overcome the presumption that, 
under the circumstances, the challenged action 'might be considered sound trial 
strategy/" Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689 (citation omitted). This standard is 
appropriately deferential, recognizing the "variety of circumstances faced by 
defense counsel" and "the range of legitimate decisions regarding how to best 
represent a criminal defendant." State v. Tyler, 850 P.2d 1250, 1254 (Utah 1993) 
(internal quotation marks and citation omitted). This deference also recognizes that, 
"[ujnlike a later reviewing court, the attorney observed the relevant proceedings, 
10 
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knew of materials outside the record, and interacted with the client, with opposing 
counsel, and with the judge/7 Harrington v. Richter, 131 S.Ct. 770, 788 (2011). 
Thus, any conceivable tactical basis for trial counsel's actions defeats a claim 
of deficient performance. See State v. Clark, 2004 UT 25, | 7, 89 P.3d 162; State v. 
Holbert, 2002 UT App 426, If 58,61 P.3d 291. Because he bears the burden, Defendant 
must "persuadje] the court that there was no conceivable tactical basis for counsel's 
actions." Clark, 2004 UT 25, f 6 (emphasis in original) (internal quotation marks and 
citation omitted). 
Defendant must ultimately demonstrate that "counsel made errors so serious 
that counsel was not functioning as the counsel guaranteed the defendant by the 
Sixth Amendment." Harrington, 131 S.Ct. at 787 (internal quotation marks and 
citation omitted). The ultimate "question is whether an attorney's representation 
amounted to incompetence under prevailing professional norms, not whether it 
deviated from best practices or most common custom." Id. at 788. 
With respect to the second Strickland prong, Defendant must show that absent 
counsel's acts or omissions, there is a reasonable probability that he would have 
received a more favorable result below. See State v. Chacon, 962 P.2d 48, 50 (Utah 
1998). A reasonable probability is a probability "sufficient to undermine confidence 
in the outcome. It is not enough to show that the errors had some conceivable effect 
on the outcome of the proceeding. Counsel's errors must be so serious as to deprive 
11 
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the defendant of a fair trial, a trial whose result is reliable." Harrington, 131 S.Ct. at 
787-88 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). Proof of prejudice must be 
based on a "demonstrable reality and not a speculative matter." Chacon, 962 P.2d at 
50. (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). 
B. Background law —lawfulness of arrest. 
"[T]he [United States] Constitution permits an officer to arrest a suspect 
without a warrant if there is probable cause to believe that the suspect has 
committed or is committing an offense." Michigan v. DeFillippo, 443 U.S. 31, 36 
(1979). "'[Pjrobable cause' to justify an arrest means facts and circumstances within 
the officer's knowledge that are sufficient to warrant a prudent person, or one of 
reasonable caution, in believing, in the circumstances shown, that the suspect has 
committed, is committing, or is about to commit an offense." Id. at 37; see also State 
v. Hansen, 2011 UT App 242, f 10, 262 P.3d 448 (quoting DeFillippo). "Whether 
probable cause exists depends upon the reasonable conclusion to be drawn from the 
facts known to the arresting officer at the time of the arrest." Devenpeck v. Alford, 543 
U.S. 146,152 (2004); see also Hansen, 2011 UT App 242, f 10. 
The probable cause requirement is intended "to safeguard citizens from rash 
and unreasonable interferences with privacy and from unfounded charges of 
crime," and also "to give fair leeway for enforcing the law in the community's 
protection." Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160,176 (1949). The probable cause 
12 
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rule "is a practical, nontechnical conception affording the best compromise that has 
been found for accommodating these often opposing interests/7 Id. Probable cause 
"does not require the fine resolution of conflicting evidence that a reasonable-doubt 
or even a preponderance standard demands, and credibility determinations are 
seldom crucial in deciding whether evidence supports a reasonable belief in guilt/7 
Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103,121 (1975). Probable cause requires merely that the 
information available to the officer show "a fair probability" that a suspect has 
committed a crime. Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213,238 (1983) (discussing the probable 
cause to believe that contraband would be found). 
C Defendant has not demonstrated that his trial counsel was 
ineffective for not moving to suppress Defendant's statements 
following his arrest 
Defendant claims that police lacked probable cause to arrest him and 
consequently that his post-arrest statements should hve been suppressed. Br. 
Appellant at 15-30. Defendant, however, did not move below to suppress. See 
Pleadings File; see also Br. Appellant at 2. Accordingly, he claims for the first time on 
appeal that counsel was ineffective for not recognizing that the arrest was unlawful 
and for not moving to suppress the statements Defendant made following the arrest. 
See Br. Appellant at 15-30. 
Where during pretrial proceedings a defendant moves to suppress statements 
made after a warrantless arrest, the State bears the burden to prove that the arrest 
13 
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was lawful. See State v. Worwood, 2007 UT 47, H 40,164 P.3d 397 ("Once a valid 
constitutional challenge is made, the burden shifts to the State to prove that its 
warrantless action was justified/7). But where, as here, a defendant does not move 
to suppress during pretrial proceedings, but instead claims on appeal that counsel 
was ineffective for not moving to suppress, a defendant bears the burden to show 
that counsel was ineffective. See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687-88, 690. Thus, a 
defendant bears the burden to show that the arrest was unlawful, that counsel 
performed deficiently for not recognizing that it was unlawful and for not moving 
to suppress the defendant's post-arrest statements, and that the defendant was 
prejudiced because counsel did not do so. Defendant has not met that burden. 
1. Defendant has not demonstrated that the arrest was unlawful 
and that counsel therefore performed deficiently for not 
moving to suppress Defendant's post-arrest statements. 
This Court cannot conclude, based on the record that Defendant has 
presented, that his arrest was unlawful. The only record Defendant has presented 
in support of his claim is the trial transcript. The trial transcript does not, by itself, 
show that the arrest was unlawful. Moreover, Detective Coats relied on other 
information not included in this record that must be construed in favor of a finding 
that counsel's performance was professionally reasonable because counsel 
recognized that the arrest was lawful. 
14 
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a. The trial testimony established facts supporting probable 
cause to justify the warrantless arrest. 
Defendant asserts that the following list contains all the facts that were at 
Detective Coats' disposal when he made the arrest: 
• The officer had a description that a 5'7" to 5'9" male black adult wearing a 
blue jacket, grey pants and dark shoes, along with a white male, over 6' tall, 
wearing a yellow hoodie with a jacket over that and pants[, was] involved in 
the attack. 
• Surveillance footage showed two males, one white and one black, call for a 
taxi from the Motel 6. 
• Mr. Magack [the taxi driver], after viewing a still image from the photo, 
confirmed that the men in the photo were the two men who attacked him. 
• The Motel 6 clerk confirmed that these two were the persons who called the 
taxi. 
• The officer circulated still photos to the media, which were run by KSL. 
• An anonymous female tipster told the officer that the attacker might be at the 
VOA Shelter for Youth, and she named a name. 
• When the officer went to the VOA, he saw a black male 'which immediately 
looked like the individual in the photograph.' 
• This black male, the defendant, 'immediately averted his eyes' and looked 
away from the officer. Then [the] defendant approached the officer, asked 
why he was there, if he was helping with donations and what he was up to. 
• The detective asked another officer to watch [the defendant], then went to 
talk with management. 
• Detective Coats talked with the director, returned, and then arrested 
[Defendant]. 
Br. Appellant at 20-21 (citing Detective Derek Coats' trial testimony at R211:17-26). 
Defendant asserts that this testimony shows only that Defendant "looked like 
the suspect" shown in the video and that Defendant "averted his eyes when the 
officer came in." Br. Appellant at 21. He claims that probable cause to arrest 
requires much more. Id. But probable cause requires only that the facts and 
15 
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circumstances known to Detective Coats show a "fair probability" that Defendant 
had committed a crime. The testimony to which Defendant points demonstrates 
such "a fair probability." 
The detective had viewed surveillance footage showing two suspects at the 
Motel 6. R21117-18. The Motel 6 clerk had identified them as the men who called 
the taxi. R211:19. The detective had circulated still photos of these suspects. Id. 
Taxi driver Magack had identified the men in the still shot taken from the footage as 
his attackers R211:18. An anonymous tipster had told Detective Coats that the 
attacker might be at the VOA. R211:22. When the officer went to the VOA, he saw 
Defendant who "immediately looked like the individual in the photograph." 
R211:23. Magack's account of the attack given to police within hours of the incident, 
R210:82-85, together with these facts, was sufficient to warrant a person of 
reasonable caution in Detective Coats' position in believing that Defendant was one 
of the suspects who committed the attack against Magack, see DeFillippo, 443 U.S. at 
37. These facts and circumstances showed "a fair probability" that Defendant had 
committed the crime. See Gates, 462 U.S. at 238. Thus, contrary to Defendant's 
claim, the arrest was supported by probable cause. 
Moreover, Defendant ignores other facts and circumstances in the record that 
provide additional support for a finding of probable cause to arrest. The trial 
transcript shows that Detective Coats also testified that when he entered the VOA 
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shelter, Defendant first averted his eyes, but then approached, locked eyes with 
[Detective Coats] and asked, without any earlier discussion of the matter, what the 
detective was "investigating." R211:24. Where Defendant initiated the encounter, 
asked without prompting about an investigation, and "locked eyes" with the 
detective, his actions suggested a consciousness of guilt. Cf. State v. Godfrey, 1999 UT 
App 53U, *1 (Godfrey's unusual response to police questions was suggestive of his 
"consciousness of guilt"). In addition, Detective Coats testified that Defendant was 
wearing the pants worn by the black suspect in the video when the detective arrived 
attheVOA. SeeR211:74-75. 
b. Defendant has not met his burden to present an adequate 
record on whether the arrest was lawful. 
Defendant also fails to include other evidence upon which Defendant Coats 
relied in deciding to make an arrest. Here, Defendant is apparently claiming that 
the pictures Detective Coats had seen of the suspect were insufficient to support the 
detective's identification of Defendant as the suspect. As explained on the record, 
Detective Coats concluded upon seeing Defendant at the VOA that Defendant 
"looked immediately like the individual in the photograph." R211:23. But the 
record Defendant has presented does not include all the evidence that may have 
supported the Detective's identification of Defendant as the suspect in the picture, 
and the resulting ambiguities and deficiencies resulting therefrom must be 
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construed in favor of a finding that counsel performed effectively. Litherland, 2000 
UT76,Tfl7. \ 
In claiming the ineffective assistance of trial counsel, Defendant bears the 
burden of assuring that "the record is adequate/' Litherland, 2000 UT 76, f 16. As a 
result, "an appellate court will presume that any argument of ineffectiveness 
presented to it is supported by all the relevant evidence of which [the] defendant is 
aware." Id. at f 17. "Where the record appears inadequate in any fashion, 
ambiguities or deficiencies resulting therefrom simply will be construed in favor of 
a finding that counsel performed effectively." Id. 
The record on appeal in this case contains one of the photographs Defendant 
Coats prepared for dissemination to police, see State's Exhibit 13, but Detective 
Coats testified that he prepared a number of still shots of Defendant from the 
surveillance video, R211:19-20. Thus, in making the identification of Defendant as 
the black suspect in the photos, Detective Coats relied not only on State's Exhibit 13, 
but also on the surveillance video itself and the other still shots made from it. See 
R211:21. Defendant has not included either the video or the other photographs in 
the record on appeal. 
Detective Coats also testified that the anonymous female tipster gave him 
both a name and an address where he could find the suspects in this case. R211:21-
22. The record Defendant has presented does not disclose what name the tipster 
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gave the detective or whether Detective Coats asked her any questions to establish 
the basis for and reliability of her tip. Moreover, Detective Coats testified that he 
spoke to the VOA shelter director before arresting Defendant. R211:26. Where the 
Detective testified that he "had a name" for the suspect, it seems likely that before 
arresting Defendant/he asked the director what Defendant's name was. And the 
director may have identified Defendant by the name the tipster gave to the 
detective. But the record presented does not include any evidence on these matters. 
As noted, counsel is presumed to have performed effectively. As explained, 
this Court must therefore construe the resulting ambiguities and deficiencies in 
favor of a finding that counsel performed effectively. Litherland, 2000 UT 76, f^ 17. 
Absent evidence to the contrary, a reviewing court must assume that trial counsel 
"knew of materials outside the record" that would have clearly shown that 
Detective Coats had probable cause to arrest Defendant and that counsel therefore 
acted within "the wide range of reasonable professional assistance" in not moving 
to suppress. Harrington, 131 S.Ct. at 788. 
Here, the Court must therefore assume that, absent contrary evidence, 
counsel's failure to raise a Fourth Amendment challenge was an exercise of sound 
trial strategy based not only on his review of the evidence eventually introduced at 
trial, but also on the surveillance video, the other still photographs, and the 
identifying information provided by the female tipster and the VOA shelter 
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director. In other words, this Court must assume that the surveillance tape and the 
still photographs taken from it showed a suspect that looked just like Defendant. 
This Court must assume that the anonymous tipster not only told Detective Coats 
that he could find the cab driver's attacker at the VOA, but that she gave Detective 
Coats Defendant's name. And, the Court must assume that the director at the VOA 
shelter identified Defendant by that name. 
In sum, any motion to suppress would have failed because probable cause 
justified the arrest. Thus, Defendant's "trial counsel cannot be considered to be 
ineffective for not making a futile motion." State v. Kozlov, 2012 UT App 114, f 57, 
706 Utah Adv. Rep. 25. 
2. Defendant has not demonstrated prejudice. 
For the same reasons, Defendant has not demonstrated prejudice. Defendant 
has not demonstrated that Detective Coats lacked probable cause to arrest 
Defendant. Defendant therefore has not shown that he suffered any prejudice. He 
has not shown that, had trial counsel moved to suppress, the motion would have 
been granted and that consequently there would have been "a reasonable 
probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding 
would have been different." Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694. 
Moreover, Defendant cannot show prejudice because the evidence against 
him, even without his post-arrest statements, was overwhelming. The evidence 
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included the surveillance video picturing him at the motel. It included Defendant 
Coats' testimony that the motel clerk identified the black male in the photo as one of 
the two men who asked her to call for a taxi shortly before Magack responded. And 
the evidence would have included Magack's identification of Defendant as the male 
who stabbed him and held his arm while the white male stabbed him from behind. 
Moreover, while Defendant claime.4 that only Ramsay attacked Magack and that 
Defendant "finally got Ramsey off Mr. Magack," R211:132, the record also contains 
Magack's testimony that Defendant both restrained and stabbed him, R211:169-71, 
and Defendant's concessions that "it would have looked like he [Defendant] was an 
attacker" and that he did nothing to help Magack following the incident, R211:41, 
155-57. In the face of this evidence, even if Defendant could show that the arrest 
was unlawful and that trial counsel performed deficiently for not moving to 
suppress his statements, he could not show prejudice. 
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CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, the Court should affirm. 
Respectfully submitted May _TL 2012. 
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U.S. Const, amend. IV 
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, 
against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants 
shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and 
particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be 
seized. 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Addendum B 
in »A - IJ J.--J 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
:
" *'•*• - # i l < A 4 , *$•;** * 
is*-. 
* % % 
^ r l f P i i f . : 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
